Cooperative game

Results: 464



#Item
91Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching Scott Duke Kominers∗,1 Department of Economics, Harvard University and Harvard Business School  Abstract

Matching with Preferences over Colleagues Solves Classical Matching Scott Duke Kominers∗,1 Department of Economics, Harvard University and Harvard Business School Abstract

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Source URL: www.scottkom.com

Language: English - Date: 2009-12-01 08:03:55
92Building Without Words: A Non-Verbal Cooperative Game for Teams of Two Players Rules: • Players cannot use words or noises to communicate. • Only Player 2 can touch the building blocks. • Only Player 1 can see the

Building Without Words: A Non-Verbal Cooperative Game for Teams of Two Players Rules: • Players cannot use words or noises to communicate. • Only Player 2 can touch the building blocks. • Only Player 1 can see the

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Source URL: cf.ltkcdn.net

- Date: 2013-04-18 13:30:03
    93Moving Remainders Division Game Basic Directions (Single Digit Divisors) Moving Remainders works well as a cooperative learning game for pairs or as a math station activity. Laminate the game boards before use because yo

    Moving Remainders Division Game Basic Directions (Single Digit Divisors) Moving Remainders works well as a cooperative learning game for pairs or as a math station activity. Laminate the game boards before use because yo

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    Source URL: www.lauracandler.com

    Language: English - Date: 2010-12-03 22:26:13
      94Cooperative Epistemic Multi-Agent Planning With Implicit Coordination Thorsten Engesser Thomas Bolander  ¨

      Cooperative Epistemic Multi-Agent Planning With Implicit Coordination Thorsten Engesser Thomas Bolander ¨

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      Source URL: www.imm.dtu.dk

      Language: English - Date: 2015-06-11 06:23:58
      95Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II) Scott Duke Kominers Society of Fellows, Harvard University  25th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory

      Introduction to Matching and Allocation Problems (II) Scott Duke Kominers Society of Fellows, Harvard University 25th Jerusalem Summer School in Economic Theory

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      Source URL: www.scottkom.com

      Language: English - Date: 2014-06-23 13:25:47
      96Discussion Paper NoAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN MATCHING PROBLEMS  Shohei Takagi

      Discussion Paper NoAN IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IN MATCHING PROBLEMS Shohei Takagi

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      Source URL: www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp

      Language: English - Date: 2006-12-11 21:08:50
      97University of Zilina Faculty of Electrical Engineering Proposal of topics for PhD study for candidates in the frame of ERASMUS MUNDUS iBRASIL project Topic Control strategies ensuring static and dynamic stability of a

      University of Zilina Faculty of Electrical Engineering Proposal of topics for PhD study for candidates in the frame of ERASMUS MUNDUS iBRASIL project Topic Control strategies ensuring static and dynamic stability of a

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      Source URL: www.ibrasilmundus.eu

      Language: English - Date: 2014-03-24 14:28:06
      98Price of Anarchy in Non-Cooperative Load Balancing 1 2 3

      Price of Anarchy in Non-Cooperative Load Balancing 1 2 3

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      Source URL: homepages.laas.fr

      Language: English - Date: 2012-01-01 05:02:51
      99Journal of Economic Theory  ET2210 journal of economic theory 71, 558article noEvolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies* Josef Hofbauer Institute of Mathematics, Vienna University, Strudlho

      Journal of Economic Theory  ET2210 journal of economic theory 71, 558article noEvolutionary Selection against Dominated Strategies* Josef Hofbauer Institute of Mathematics, Vienna University, Strudlho

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      Source URL: www.dklevine.com

      Language: English - Date: 2010-12-10 18:40:54
      100Theories of coalitional rationality∗ Attila Ambrus† Abstract This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal f

      Theories of coalitional rationality∗ Attila Ambrus† Abstract This paper generalizes the concept of best response to coalitions of players and offers epistemic definitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal f

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      Source URL: public.econ.duke.edu

      Language: English - Date: 2012-08-28 11:36:22